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STATEME;NT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This cas'e is a boundary lillle dispute case brought by 
San Juan County, Utah, a;s Plaintiff, seeking a1n injunc-
tion against the Defendant Grand County's continued exer-
cise o:f jurisdiction over an area "approximately 2/3 of a 
mile wide" between the Colorado border and the Green 
Rdver. The Plaintiff also seeks a judgment for the tax 
money adtrnirttedly colltected in said disputed area by Grand 
County. Gra!Ild County, on the other hand, counterclaimed 
and in its Counterclaim ·contends that old surveys con-
ducted by the parties and others and acquies0ed in over a 
long period of time creates- the tTue and correct common 
boundary betw~e·n the two counties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that it did not have juris-
diction to hear and determine the issue·s presented to it, 
either on the Plaintiff's Complaint or on the Defendant's 
Counterclaim and dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint and 
the Defendant's Counterclaim and awarded costs to the 
Defendant; the Defendant appeals and the Plaintiff crosB-
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seek's a reversal of that porti'Onl of the judg-
ment 01:f the lower court that holds that the court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the isiSues pre-
sented to it by the Defendant's Countercbim, and from 
that portion of the judgment and decree dismissing De-
fendant's Counterclaim and seeros· a decree establishing 
that as a matter of law the common boundary between the 
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two counties is the line found by the trial court to have 
been surveyed lby mutual com sent and by the joint effort 
of thte· two counties pursuant to Utah Law. It is also the 
position of the Defendant that the line found by the Court 
to have been surveyed and marked on the ground by the 
two count:i!e·s corresponds to the south line of Township 26 
South and as a matter of law said line so established and 
acquiesced in for a long period of tim•e create·s a boundary 
by prescription and estoppel and should be declared to be 
the common boundary line be:twe-en the two counties. 
It is the further contention of the Defendant that the 
Parallel 38°30' North Latitude as fixed by the State Leg-
islature and as hi·storically marked on the ancient maps 
and plats and acquiesced in by both Grand and San Juan 
Counties is the common boundary line betwe-en the two 
counties as a matter of law; that once so established and 
fixed neither the State Enginee·r nor the Legislature itself 
can declare said boundary line to be otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 18, 1958, for the first time, a judicial 
determination of the common boundary between Grand 
and San Ju'an Counties was brought by San Juan County 
in an effort on the part of San Juam County to obtain an 
order of the court for an accounting and money judgment 
against the Defendant for taxets admittedly collected by 
the Defendant in the disputed area and to restrain the 
Defendant from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the 
so-called "disputed area," which the Plaintiff alleges to be 
a line on Parallel 38°30' North Latitude and which it states 
in its Complaint is "approximately 2/3 of a mile north of 
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the south boundary line of Township 26 South," (Paragraph 
15 of Plaintiff's Complaint) as determined by a reconnais-
sance performed by the Corus:t and Geodetic Survey hranch 
of the F1ederal Governm,enrt at the request of the State 
Engineer. The Defendant Grand County admits that it has 
exerdsed jurisdiction and control over said disputed area 
and that it had collected the taXIe·s in the so-called "disputed 
area" and would continue to do so unless restrained by 
order of the Court. (See paragraph 10 of PLaintiff's Com-
plaint and paragraph 10 of Defendant's Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim). Defendant Grand County contends that 
the two counties had, by mutual consent and joint effort, 
surveyed the common boundary and that thereafter both 
counties acquiesced in said line as the boundary line for a 
long period of time, thus establishing the common boun-
dary between said counties, which line it so happens is 
coincident with the south line of Township 2,6 South as it 
thas come to be marked on the· earth's surface, and further 
contends that all of the early surveys placed the common 
boundary and Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on a line co-
incident with the south line of Township 26 South. 
On the 18th day of November, A.D., 1960, a pre-trial 
order of the· Court framed the i~ssues as follows: 
"1. Wh1at was the boundary between the plaintiff 
and the defendant orf 1896, at th1e time the State of Utah 
was adn1itted to rthe Union. 
2. What is the common boundary line between the 
parties as of the present timie. 
3. Where is the boundary line to be established on the 
surface of the earth. 
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4. What amount of taxes, if any, collected by Grand 
County is the pl1aintiff entitled rto; and whether or not the 
Statute of Limitations applies to this is,sue. 
5. Whether or not the parties have acquiesCled in the 
boundary now established upon the surface of the earth." 
The :iJs,sues thus joined the case were presented to 
the trial court, the question of taxes payable from Grand 
County to San Juan County being deferred by the Court 
until after the location orf the common boundary had been 
disposed of. 
The evidence presented disclosed that all of the· old 
maps show the :south line of Township 26 South to be the 
common boundary between the two counties while the more 
recent ones show the common boundary to be somewhat 
nomh of the south line orf Township 26 South. 
The old Bureau of Land Management township plat1s 
which are on file in the State Land Office show Parallel 
38°30' North Latitude to be either just south of or as being 
the same line as the south line o;f Township 26 South. 
In the year 1912 the two counties, by mutual agree-
ment, conducted a joint survey to ascertain and mark the 
common boundary between the two counties. 
In the year 1958, Gra:nd and San Juan Counties en-
gaged the s·erviCies of the State Engineer to determine as 
best he could the location orf Parallel 38°30' North Latitude. 
The State Engineer never conducted any surv!e·y or placed 
any monuments upon 38°30' North Latitude or at any other 
place pursuant to said employment but did request th~ 
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Coast and Geodetic Department of the Federal Government 
to conduct a reconnaissanCie which was done. No further 
steps were taken and the project wws wbandoned. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the court took the 
caSie under advisement 'rund on the 12th day of September, 
1961, the trial court made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, which facts found read in words 
and figur.es as follows, to-wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
"1. That the Plaintiff San Juan County is now, and 
ever since February 17, 1880, has been, a body corporate 
and politic of either the Territory af Utah or of the State 
of Utah. 
2. That the Defendant Grand County i~ now and 
sinete March 13, 1890, has been a body cnrporate and 
politic of either the Terr:Utory of Utah or the State o[ 
Utah. 
3. That the oom.mon boundary line between Grand 
and San Juan Counties as defined by the Territ·orial 
Legislatui~e of the Territory of UtaJh, and later by the 
Legislature of the State of Utah, hajs never varied and 
has always been described as Parallel 38°30' North 
L'atitude. 
4. That the State Legislature provided a means 
for the detemnination of the location o[ boundary lines 
upon the ground in the event of a dispute between couru-
ti~s and this method has remained substantially the 
same through the years and is presently identified as 
Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
5. That sometime in 1958, ·the two counties en-
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gaged the State Engineer to survey and mark the eo!m-
mon boundary line between the two counties. The State 
Engineer never conduct1ed any survey or placed any 
monuments on Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude, or any 
other place pursuant to said employment but requested 
the Goa&t and Geodetic Department of the Federal Gov-
ernment to do a reconnlaissantce survey, which was con-
ducted by said Ooasrt and Geodetic Department of the 
Federal Government. No further .steps were taken and 
the project was abandoned. 
6. There is evidence in the record that in the year 
1912, the County surveyors of the Plaintiff and Defend-
ant Counties surveyed the common boundary line be-
tween the two counties and there iJs evidence of monu-
me·nts and other markings being made, but the exact 
location thereof cannot now be determined. 
7. That the procedure set forth by the Legislature 
for determining County boundaries in case of dispute 
has not been complied with by the parties~. 
The Court concluded from the fol"egoing facts that it 
did not ihave jurisdiction in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT N0.1 
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear and dete·r-
mine the issues presenrted to it by the Defendant's Coun-
terclaim and in the light of the 'evidence presented the 
Defendant Grand County iJs entitled to a judgment as a. 
matter (jf law establishing the· line found by the Court to 
have been surveyed, marked and monumented by the 
mutual consent and agreement of the- two cou111ties to be 
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the true common boundary line between the two counties. 
The Court has j ur:Usdiction to determine this matter. 
In 20 C. J. S.. Counrt;ies, Section 21, page 772, it is s•tated: 
"Suit in Equity. In the absence of such a statute a court 
of equity has j urisdietion to detemJ.ine the true location of 
a d]sputed boundary between counties, and, if necessary, 
cause the line to he marked by permanent monuments." 
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction 
in all matters civil and criminal not excepted by :this· Con-
stitution, and not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction 
from all inferior courts and tribunals, and a supervisory 
control of sam·e. The Diistrict Courts or any judge thereof, 
shall h·ave the power to .issue writs of Habeas Corpus, man-
damus, injunctions, give warrants, certiorari prohibitions 
and other writs nece•ssary to carry into effect the orders, 
judgments. and decre:es, and to give them general control 
over inferior Courts and tribunals within their respective 
j urisdi•ctions." 
The Statutes disclose, and the Court fuund, that "the 
Legislature provided a mea.ns for determilllirng the location 
of boundary lines upon the ground in the event of dispute 
or uncertainty between counties and this method has re-
mained substantially the same, through the years and is 
pres1ently identified as Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953," and which reads as follows: 
"17-1-33. Disputed boundaries- Determination-
Whenever any dispute or uncertainty shall ariJs.e as to 
amy county boundary the same may be determined by 
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the county surveyors of the counties interested, and in 
case they fail to agree or otherwise· fail to establish the 
boundary, the board of county commissioners of either 
or ~both counties interested shall engage the· services of 
the state engineer who, with the aforesaid county sur-
veyors, or either of them, if but one appears for that pur-
pos,e, all having received due and proper notice, shall 
proceed forthwith to permanently determine such boun-
dary line by making the necessary surveys and erecting 
suitable m'Onuments to de·s,ignate the boundaries, which 
shall be deemed permanent until superseded by legisla-
tive enactment. Nothing in this s:ection shall he con-
strued to give the surveyors or state engineer any fur-
ther authority than to erect suitable monum:e·nts to 
des,ignate boundaries as they are now estwblished by law. 
History: R. S. 1898 Sec. 487; L. 1907 Ch 82, Sec. 
1; C. L. 1907 Sec. 487; C. L. 1917 Sec. 1322; R, S, 1933 
and C. 1943, 19-1-33." 
The Defendant Grand County's first point on this 
appeal i's that when a county line has been run and marked 
on the ground in accordance with law by the agents desig-
nated by the Legislature for that purpose that it is conclu-
sive a.nd can only be changed by legislative enactment and 
that where the trial ~court round the facts to exist the court 
has jurisdiction and must issue an order accordingly. 
The Findings of the trial court, above quoted with 
respect to the joint survey of the two counties and the 
markings a.nd monumenting of the line, are fully ·supported 
by the evidence submitted to the trial court. 
The minutes of the meetings of the Plaintiff San Juan 
County were introduced in evidence by the Defendant 
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Grand County and the uncontradicted testimony of C. R. 
C!hristensen, former official of Sam Juan County, confirmed 
the fact that a joint survey by the counties to thi;s action 
was conducted by the two counties, whose agents marked 
and monum·ented the common boundary line between said 
counties from the Colorado border to the Green River. 
(Def'endant's Exhibits, 129 through 139.) 
C. R. Christensen, a former A'Ssessor of San Juan 
County, testified on February 14, 1961, (Transcript of Trial 
Proceeding!&, Volume II, page 453 through 485) parts of 
whicih will be set forth £or the benefit of the Court as 
follows: 
"Q. Mr. Chritstensen do you know whether or not the 
boundary line between Grand County and San Juam. County 
has ever been surveyed? (Lines 22-23-24, page 455.) 
A. Yes, Sir. (Line 25, page 455.) 
Q. When to the best of your recollection? (Lines 
4-5, pa.ge 456.) 
A. The fall and summer of 1912 is the best of my 
recollection. That is the 'survey I was on anyway. (Lines 
6-7-8, page 456.) 
Q. Did you participate in it? (Lines 9-10, page 456.) 
A. Yes, sir. (Line 11, page 456.) 
Q. Well, will you tell us who YQU remember to be 
there? (Lines 19-20, page 458.) 
A. There was Harry Preston, Gene Rogerson, An-
drew Middlemist, IDYiSe1f amd Branson. I believe his name 
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was Tom Branson. He was one of the Commissioners from 
Grand County. The Chairman, I understood. (Lines 22-23-
24, page 458.) 
Q. Now who wrus Harry Preston? (Lines 25-26, 
page 458.) 
A. He· was a. young surveyor that came to this coun-
try and married a Monticello girl. . . . . (Lines 27 through 
30, page 458; lines 1-2-3, page 459.) 
Q. Where was Harry Preston living at that time? 
(Lines 4-5, page 459.) 
A. This was his hoone. (Line 6, page 459.) 
Q. You mean Moab when you say this? (Lines 7-8, 
page 459.) 
A. Yes, sir, she was living with her mother, and 
when he was at home ihe was with her. (Lines 9-10, 
page 459.) 
Q. Tell us what you know about Middlemist. (Lines 
22-23, page 459.) 
A. He lived at Monticello, e·ast of there, and home-
steaded there. (Li~ne~s 24-25, page 459.) 
Q. What was his profession? (Lines 26-27, page 
459.) 
A. He had worked with a surveyor by the name of 
E. C. Laure. In fact, quite a surveyor, that is not a sur-
veyor but a lineman. That is what they called him. (Lines 
28-29-30, page 459.) 
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Q What did you do and what did you see done? 
(Lines 24-25, page 461.) 
A Well, I helped tend camp around there and done 
some chaining and the boys, Preston and Middlemist, were 
trying to determine the starting point on that State line to 
run the line west to determine the line ibetween the two 
counties. (Lines 26 through 30, page 461.) 
Beginning on page 462 throuwh line 18, page 467) C. 
R. Christensen testifh~d as follows : 
"Q. Did they :e!Stablish a starting point? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When they established the starting point how 
did they mark it? 
A. Well, I couldn't tell you definitely. I saw them 
mark it .and saw them start, but I couldn't tell you just-
they piled up 1some rock. Oh, we were there a day or two. 
I couldn't tell you what happened. 
Q. T:hey did pile up some rock? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then after you started what did, what was done 
up there? 
A. They started running a line directly west. 
Q. Well to your best recollection can you tell us 
what they did in running this line? 
A. W·eU, sometimes they could chain, but they did 
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more in lining and putting up monuments so they could 
trace it. 
Q. Did they set up instruments? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then with these instruments they surveyed 
a line, is that correct? 
A. Well, I don't know whether they did anything 
elise. They looked th~ough a transit. I looked through it 
several times, and a number of the other boys. 
Q. Now, did you put marks on this line? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What, can you describe some of the mark!s that 
were placed on it? 
A. Yes, sir. Some of them. They were when there 
were rock handy, they piled up a pretty good pile of rock 
and Rogerson had the job of marking thos·e rocks with a 
hammer and coal chis·el. 'Tihat was hi1s joib mainly. But he 
didn't stay right on the job because-
Q. Well, describe one of these monuments, if you 
can. One of the rock monuments. How large it was and 
so forth. 
A. Well, it depended a little on how plentiful the 
rock were. Sometimes larger. But they aimed to put them 
about four f·eet high where the rock was handy, and tlhe 
base, it was bigger around on the bottom than the top. 
It sloped up. 
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Q. Did you mark them in places where there weren't 
rock? How did you mark them in those plac:es? 
A. Well, there was trees some of the way. Very 
thick trees. And they had trouble getting througih thos:e 
trees, and they would off-set, he called it. 'Dhey would 
measure a distance, if that was th:e erust and west line, or 
north and south line, east and west line, they would meas-
off a chain or so many links 1south trying to find those 
marks ..... 
Q. Now am I correret, then, in other wordls, where 
the trees were real thick and they couldn't get through 
they made some off-sets? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, do you know whether or not they made 
any marks on trees? 
A. Yes,sir. 
Q. How did they do that? 
A. 'llh:ey would bark them. I had a little axe of my 
own. I would, what we called scalping down the side. And 
this Rogerson, well, Andy, mostly, had a hammer that he 
would knock a mark in to them. Give tlhe initials. 
Q. Now you said you started on the eaJSt line. That 
would he· on the boundary between Colorado and Utah? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you pr-oceeded west, i.s that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now how far west did you go, Mr. Chdsrtensen? 
A. To tJhe Green River. 
Q. To the Gre·en River? 
A. Yes, sir. I and two others in the party started 
out. Some didn't go through. They changed some of the 
crew at the Saw Mill. Branson was. Another man, he had 
a partner the-re. Can't speak hils name right now, but I know 
it if I hear it. 
Q. Did you yourself go all the way to the Green 
River? 
A. Yes,s ir. 
Q. As-now, during this survey were there people 
there from both counties? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. BURTON: We made a.n objection there. 
Q. Who was the·re from Grand County? 
A. Well, there was different men at different times, 
but Branson was all the way until we got in this valley, 
or this valley south of UJs here, and for some--well, he helped 
back of the rocks here too. So they had quite a time getting 
lined up that, over that cliff, what they called back of the 
rocks And he was with us. 
* * * * 
Q. Did you go through that area, the Poverty Fla:ts? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. And then over back of the rocks. Is that what 
you said? 
A. Y:es, sir. West, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know who else was :from Grand County? 
A. Yes,-
* * * * 
A. Yes. There was, well, now, just where they came 
on. Joe Hammond was with from over back of the rockls. 
He had sheep in that neighborhood, and he wanted to know 
where the line was. 
Q. And Harry Preston, is he one? 
A. Harry Preston and Middlemist. 
Q. Was Middlemist from Grand or San Juan 
County? 
A. He was from San Juan mostly. 'lihat is where he 
homesteaded. He was an unmarried man. 
Q. Now who was from San Juan County other than 
yourself? 
A. Rogerson and Middlemist. 
Q. Were you acquainted with Mr. Hyde? 
A. What Hyde? There's several of them. 
Q. Do you know wlhethe-r or not a Hyde was a 
commissioner at that time in 1910? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. What were his initials? 
A. F. H., Frank H. Hyde. 
Q Were you acquainted with him? 
A. Quite well. 
Q. Nnw during that time did you ever have a con-
versation with Mr. Hyde concerning a boundary line? 
A. Prior to tlhat time I had. Not while we were 
running the line I didn't. 
Q. Mr. Christensen, do you know what the purpose 
of this 1survey was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the purpose of the survey? 
A. My understanding was to determine the line be-
tween the two counties, there was dissatisfaction between 
the commissioners and the patrons in that county, and 
some in thi·s. It was my understanding that was the reason 
for the survey." 
The uncontradicted and only evidence on the subject 
of the existence of the disputed or uncertain boundary be-
tween Grand and San Juan Counti'e·s and the joint effort 
of the two counties to resolve same is presented above and 
is in complete and absolute harmony with the trial court's 
Finding No.6 that the·re was such a survey and monument-
ing pursuant to the statute referred to in the Court's Find-
ing No.4. 
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The uncontradicted testimony of Richard 0. Cozzens, 
Civil Engineer and Land Surveyor, coupled with the 'be·sti-
mony of old-time residents and viewed in the light of the 
old maps and plats demonstrates that Parallel 38°30' North 
Latitude as determined by all the surveyoi'!s at the time of 
the joint effort of the two counties was on a line coincident 
with the south line of Township 26 South. 
Richard 0. Cozzens, Civil Engineer and Land Sur-
veyor, uncontradicted testimony shoWls that on February 
1, 1961, h:e drove to a point on the south line of Township 
26 South, where were two signs, one facing south reading 
"Entering Grand County" (See Defendant's Exhibit 109) 
and the other facing north l}eading "Entering San Juan 
County" (See Defendant's Exhibit 159) Transcript of 
frial Proceedings, Vol. II, lines 14 through 19 and 25 
through 28, page 402, and lines 9 through 23, page 426.) 
'Tihat in running a line east and west from said points 
he :found a pile of stones which showed extreme effects of 
the elements and looked aged. (Lines 7-8, pag 425.) He 
took pictures of them, which are identified as Defendant's 
E~hibits 4 7 and 48; some distance therefrom he found other 
stones in a straight line indicating the boundary line. (De-
fendant's Exhibit 145.) 
On February ·6, 1961, Witness Cozze·ns found a blazed 
pine tree about 30 feet south of a straight line from the 
monuments identified aJS Exhibits 47, 38 and 145. The blazes 
sihowed extreme signs of weathering and age. (See Tra.n-
s.cript lines 6 through 16, page 421, and Defendant's Ex-
hibit 162.) 
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Witness Cozzellls' uncontradicted testimony shows 
that the old monuments established by the joint survey of 
the two counties are located on a. line which for all practical 
purposes corresponds with the s·outh line of Township 26 
South, Salt Lake Bas.e and Meridian. 
Witness R. L. Holyoak's uncontradicted testimony 
identified the Exhibits referred to above by Witness 
Cozzens and stated that ihe has been in the area for about 
fifty-four ye·ars (Transcript of Trial P:r.oceedings, Vol. II, 
page 340, lines 7 and 8) and that he could not rem·emher 
a time when these marks were not there. 
The joint surve·y conducted by the two counties 
placed tlhe common boundary om a line which has come to 
be known aJs the south line of Township 26 South, which 
fact is not strange since the surveyors were using the 
same methods and the same kind of instruments that 
were used by the· early government surveyors who placed 
Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on a line coinciding with 
the south line of Township 26 South, Salt Lake Ba·se and 
Meridian. It is conspicuous that the only fixed location on 
the .earth's surface referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint 
is a reference to the ·south line of Township 26 South. 
Another aid in fixing the location of a common boun-
dary between the two counties which the trial court appar-
ently neglected to consider when stating that the joint 
survey marked and monumented in 1912, "could not now 
be determined" was the fact that after said joint survey 
was completed San Juan County acquiesced in its fixed 
location and ihas never sought any legislative or judicial 
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determination of its common boundary with Grand County 
until this suit was commenced by it on December 18, 1958. 
In 20 C. J. S. (Counties) Section 21, Page 772, it is 
stated : "Where the boundary line between two counties is 
uncertain in view of legislative acts and other matters of 
which the Court takes judicial knowledge, extrinsic evi-
dence ils admissible in determining the boundary. The evi-
dence admissible includes maps of the territory involved, 
published by authority of law, as well as oral and written 
evidence of the assumption and continuows exercise of 
juris diction over the territory by one county. The testimony 
of parties running county lines, of those present and asiSist-
ing therein, and of those present and s·eeing the line as it 
was run is competent and entitled to the greatest weight." 
IN PUGET SOUND NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE v. 
FISHER, Supreme Court of Washington, 1909, 100 P. 724, 
the Court stated the rule to be as follows: "It would seem 
that no hi~her and better evidenee could be offered than 
that of assumption and continuous exercise of juriiSdiction 
over the territory by one county for many years, extending 
back beyond the memory of living witnesses and which 
jurisdiction wals acquiesced in by the citizens of both coun-
ties to a comparatively recent time." 
ln VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, 148 U. S. 503, Mr. 
Justice Field in a case involving a disputed boundary which 
had been by compact previously marked on what was 
thought to be parallel 36°30' North Latitude and wihose 
markings had been rendered difficult of certainty by oblit-
eration 1stated: "The compact in this cas·e having received 
the con.sent of Congress, though not in expr~s~ terms, yet 
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impliedly, and subsequently, which is equally effective, be-
came obligatory and binding upon all the citizens of both 
Virginia and Tennessee. Nor is it any objection that there 
may have· been errors in the line whi0h the states by their 
compact sanctioned. A·fter such compacts have been adhered 
to for years neither party can be absolved from them upon 
showing errors, mistakes or misapprehension of their 
terms, or in the line established; this is a complete and 
perfect answe·r to the complainants' position in this case." 
In INDIANA v. KENTUCKY, 136 U. S. Reports, Mr. 
Justice Field on pa.ge 515 states: "It is an admission en-
tit,led to great weight in explaining the cause of the states 
general acquiescence, from the time it was admitted into 
the Union up to the passage of that act, in the claim and 
jurisdiction of Kentucky .... whilst on the part of Indiana 
there was want of affirmative action in the ass·ertion of her 
present claim, and a general acquiescence in the claim of 
Kentucky; there ws affirmative action on the part of Ken-
tucky in her assertion of her rights." 
In the present case there is no question that the·re 
was affirmative action on the part of Grand County in her 
assertion of her rights as evidenced by the· very nature of 
this case and there was a recognition of the line surveyed 
and marked and monum·ented ,by the joint efrforts of the 
two counties at least until very recent years ats evidenced 
by the testimony of C. R. Christensen, the former Assessor 
of San Juan County, whose testimony on this point is set 
forth in detail on pages 34-35-36 of this Brie·f. Since Grand 
County was exercising jurisdiction and oontrol over the 
so-called disputed area. and levied, assessed and collected 
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taxes ·thereon without interruption by San Juan County, 
it had no occasion to seek a judicial determination of its 
common boundary with San Juan County. San Juan County 
on the other hand conspicuously never sou~ht any legisla-
tive or judicial determination of its common boundary 
until this suit was instituted on the 18th day of December, 
1958, when it made affirmative allegations in its Complaint 
that the Defendant assumes judsdiction over the disputed 
area and its inhabitants and levies and collects taxes against 
them and that Defendant would continue to do so unless re-
st~ained by Court Order from doing so. (Paragraph 10 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint) Defendant admitted all of Plaintiff's 
assertions. (Paragraph 10 of Defendant's Amended 
Answer.) 
All of the old p1ats of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment wthich are on file in the Utah State Land Office and 
which are a pa~t of the evidence show the south line of 
Township 26 South to be coincident with and the same line 
as Parallel 38°30' North Latitude or show 38°30' North 
Latitude to be slightly south of the south line of ToWil!-
'ship 26 South, and all of the old maps show the sout!h line 
of Township 26 South to be the common boundary between 
the two counties. (See Defendant's Exhibits 23 through 31.) 
George M .. Bacon, former Utah State Engineer, on 
September 5, 1925, in an exchange of correspondence with 
F. B. Hammond, County Attorney of San Juan County, 
stated that the South Township line of Township 26 South 
"is meant to coincide with the line of Latitude 38°30' min-
utes No." (Defendant's Exhibit 67), and tihat he found "the 
SE corner of Township 26 South, Range 23 East are given 
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as located exactly at Latitude No. 38°30'." 
Witness Hubert C. Lambert, Deputy Utah State E'n-
gineer, testified for the Plaintiff San Juan County that the 
plats and maps of the earlier day·s show Latitude 38°30' as 
close to or coincidtmtal with the south line of Township 26 
South (Transcript lines 19 through 28, page 161.) 
It is submitted that there i·s overwhelming proof that 
the line found by the trial, marked and monumented by the 
joint efforts of the two counties, and acquiesced in is not 
indefinite and can now be determined and that it i~s for all 
practical purposes the same line as the south line of Town-
ship 26 South, Salt Lake· Base and Meridian, and that it 
was the obligation of tihe trial court to order that the old 
survey conducted by the parti•es pursuant to law be· re-
marked and re-monumented if the old marks and monu-
ments have become obs,cure. 
Justice Field in discussing a similar question in the 
case of VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, Supreme Court of the 
of the United States, (supra) stated: "The commi1ssioners 
appointed unde·r the act of Virginia of 1856, and under the 
act of Tennessee 1858,. found ail of the old marks upon the 
trees in the forest th~ough which the line estabHsihed ran 
in the form of a diam~nd; and whenever they were indis-
tinct, or, in the judgment of the commissioners, too far re-
moved from each other, new marks were made upon the 
trees, or if no trees were found at particular places to be 
marked, monuments in stone were planted. Besides this, the 
State of Virginia does not ask that the line of 1803 shall 
be· re-run or re-ma.rked, but proposes . that a new boundary 
line_ be _run. on the line of. 3.6 ° 30'. Tennessee does not ask 
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that the line of 1803 be re-run or re-marked. Nevertheless, 
under the prayer of Virginia for general relief, there can 
be no objection to the restoration of any marks which may 
be cfound to be obliterated and become indistinct upon the 
line as, herein defined. 
"Our judgment, therefore, is that the boundary line 
established by the State of Virginia and Tennessee by the 
Compact of 1803 is the true boundary betwe·en them, and 
that on a proper application, based upon a showing that 
any marks for identification of that line have been obliter-
ated or have become indi,stinct, an order may he made, at 
any time during the present term, for the restoration of 
such marks without any change of the lines." 
The same result was reached in the case of NEW 
MEXICO v. COLORADO, 364 U. S. 296. In this case the 
statutes cfixed the common boundary line 1between the two 
states on the 37th parallel of north latitude between its 
intersection with the 103rd on 109th meridians of longitude 
west from Greenwich. In pointing up :the issues the Court 
said, "The only dispute is as to the alleged location of this 
line. Dicfferent surveys have been made. New Mexico alleges 
in its hill that the true line is that which was surveyed 
and marked by Howard B. Carpenter in 1903, and prays 
that this be decreed to be the boundary. Colorado, in answer 
and cross bill, alleges that the true line is that which was 
surveyed and marked 1by Elhud N. Darling in 1868, and 
extended by John J. Major and Levi S. Preston in 187 4 and 
1900; and prays that this Hne be decreed to be the boun-
dary, and that, in so lfar as necessary it he restored and 
re-marked. 
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''When Carpenter made hi's' surve·y in 1903 'He was 
not directed to retrace the lines previously established, but 
was directed to make an independent survey, and was 
specifically instructed to "obliterate" all evidences of cor-
ners and monuments that had been set by Darling." 
The Court he·ld: "We have no occasion, how•ever, to 
determine the question, or to settle the precise location of 
the parallel line rus· an original matter, since·, upon the un-
contradicted facts, it is entirely clear that the line of the 
parallel as surveyed and marked by Darling westerly from 
the Macomb monument, and by Major and Preston from 
the Macomb .monument to the Preston monument, must 
now be taken as the established boundary * * * *. From 1868, 
when Darling ran and marked the line of the 37th parallel, 
to 1919, when this suit was brought, a period of more than 
half a century, this line was recognized and acquiesced in, 
successively, as the boundary between the two Territories, 
between the State of Colorado and the Territory of New 
Mexico and between the two states. * * * * The effect of this 
recognition of the Darling line by the United States was not 
impaired by the temporary recognition of the Carpenter 
line of the· General Land Office, from 1904 to 1908. * * * * 
And independently o[ these matters New Mexico i·s bound 
by its own recognition and adoption of the Darling line, 
from 1912 to the beginning of this suit, after its admission 
to statehood." 
"Thh boundary line should now be resurveyed and 
remarked by the commissione·r or commissioners appointed 
by the Court; such action to be subject to its approval. 
Missouri v. Iowa, supra p. 679 ; Indiana v. Kentucky 136 
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U. S. 479, 519; Oklahoma v. Texas 260 U. S. 606, 640." 
IN HUNT COUNTY v RAINS COUNTY, 7 SW 2d 
648, the Texas Court in determining a similar case to the 
one in dispute said: "And it is the firmly settled rule that 
a court has no power to direct another 'survey to be made 
and thereby establish another county boundary line differ-
ent from the one estwblished at some former period, when 
a county line has been once run, marked upon the ground 
and established 'in accordance with law.' Jones v. Powers, 
65 Tex 207; Pecos County v. Brewster County, (Tex Cir. 
App.) 250 SW 310; Lampasos County v. Gorryell County, 
27 Tex. Cir. App. 195, 65 SW 67." 
Irf there is any question with respect to the exact 
location of the marros and monuments which the county 
surveyors by the·ir joint efforts placed upon the earth's 
surface said line should be re-established and re-marked 
in keeping with the authorities' above cited. 
Under the provisions of 17-1-33 Utah Code Annotated, 
1958, disputed or uncertain boundaries can be settled and 
whe~e the ~statute has been followed, as in this case, the 
boundaries so determined shall "be deemed permanent 
until superseded by legislative enactment." In construing 
stautes of thi~s kind the Defendant cites the Court the 
following authorities as supporting its position in this case. 
16 Corpu Juds Secundum, (Constitutional Law), Sec. 
138, Section 15, page ·614, states: 
"The power to fix the boundaries of political sub-
divisions cannot be delegated but details as to the de-
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.termination of the location of boundaries may be left 
to administrative agencies." 
The Oalifornia courts have supported the general 
statement set forth above beginning with the case of 
PEOPLE ex rei BORRELL v. BOGGS, 56 Cal. 648. "We 
~think it was competent for the Leg1s1ature· to direct its 
ofrfice'r to go upon the ground, run his lines along that ridge, 
and in doing so he was acting merely in a ministerial capac-
ity; and we think that it was competent for the Legislature 
to declare that the lines so run that is the location of the 
boundary line upon the ground should be thereby defined 
and fixed." 
The Supreme Court of California in a land mark case 
entitled "TRINITY COUNTY v. MENDOCINO COUNTY, 
90 P. 685,'' cited at great length here because of its extreme 
similarity to the case at bar, assumed jurisdiction and de-
termined the common boundary between Trinity County 
and Mendocino County. 
"It is conceded that if, after the survey was made, 
the Legislature had enacted a law providing that the line 
so marked ~sihould be the boundary line· between the counties 
it would thereupon constitute such boundary, no matter 
how much it deviated rfrom the true line or position of the 
fortieth parallel, and that, even if such subsequent act was 
passed in ignorance of the mistake or error in the survey, 
it would make no difference· in this respect. But it is con-
tended that it is not competent for the Legislature to de-
clare, in advance of the work, that the line which mig'lht be 
surveyed and marked by the surveyor should be the true 
line. We can see no essential difference between the two 
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propositions, so far as the mere matter of legislative power 
is concerned. The rule in regard to such legislation is thus 
stated by the authorities: 'The Legislature cannot delegate 
the power to make laws, but it can delegate the power to 
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law 
makes or intends to make, its own action depend. Locke's 
Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 722; State v. Thompson, 
160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L. R. A. 950, 83 Am. St 
Rep. 468; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69, 37 Am. Rep. 6; Pu~blo 
Co. v. Smith, 22 Colo., 534,46 Pac. 360, 362, 33 L. R. A. 4'65; 
in re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558 38 Pac. 981, 27 L. R. A. 529; 8 
Cyc. 830; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1029, 1032. "':' * * * Here, the 
Legislature having declared that the county boundary 
,should be the forti•eth parallel, it further provided that its 
location should be established by a surveyor and marked 
accordingly, and that the line so fixed and marked should 
be the true boundary. The surveyor was directed to ascer-
tain the position of that parallel on the ground in accord-
ance with the rules of his science and by means of the 
instruments of his profession. The exact position was pre-
sumably unknown. Perhaps it may be said that it cannot, 
by human means, be ascertained with absolute certainty. 
It was the·re.fore competent for the Legislature to settle all 
controversy over the question by providing for a survey 
and dclaring in advance that the line as surveyed should 
be the true boundary line. It cannot be conceded that the 
Legislature cannot delegate the power to determine con-
trary to the fact. The power to decide necessarily includes 
the power to decide erroneously; but the fact, once decided, 
whether true or false, is nevertheless effective for its 
purpose. 
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"The act provided that the surveyor, when employed, 
should 'accurately run' the line of the fortieth parallel. It 
is contended that the e·ffect of this language is that if he 
ran it inaccurately his survey would be void; that the words 
quoted were a limitation upon ;bis power, such that he could 
make no legal survey unle-ss it was •sufficiently clear by 
Section 1 above quoted. That section manifestly was made 
in view of the contingency that the survey might not he 
absolutely correct, and its purpose and effect was that, 
whether correct or not, the line surveyed and marked should 
thereupon be the true line. The construction conte-nded for 
would le·ave the county lines always subject to change and 
uncertainty ; if the line- of that parallel and not any par-
ticular surveyed line thereof is to be the true county line, 
it would be subject to relocation and change whene·ver new 
discoveries, more accurate instruments or more careful 
surveys should demonstrate- that the previously surveyed 
line was incorrectly located on 'the ground. If the true line 
of the parallel, and no other, was to be the lawful line-, the 
surveying and marking of any line would accomplish noth-
ing. It would, indeed, indicate the place where the- particular 
surveyor ascertained and believed the position of the true 
line to be, and to prove which might show it to be false, 
and there would be no remedy, except by legislative act. 
The matte·r of establishing a county boundary is for the 
Legislature. If it has declared that the true line of the 
parallel i·s the line, the courts cannot declare any other line 
to be the boundary, in the absence of legislative authority 
to so declare. The- Court can declare and construe the law 
on the subject, but it cannot declare and establish the fact 
that the parallel is situated el•sewhere than in its true· loca-
ion; and, if that location is to be the sole criterion, the 
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Court's decree must be as much subject to such inquiry and 
dispute as the survey of any surveyor. It i~s not to be sup-
posed that the Legislature intended to reduce the proposed 
survey and location to such a mere idle ceremony. 
"It is said that under the theory of the law the 
surveyor might arbitrarily locate the line 10, 15 or even 
50 miles d:'rom the true line. There 1s, no charge that the 
surveyor fraudulently located the line. What the effect 
would be if he did 1act fraudulently we need not decide. But, 
so far as mere inaccuracy is concerned, it seems clear that 
it would not affect the question. In any event, the location 
of the county lines i~s a political question, to be settled by 
the legislative power of the state, and subject to change 
from time to time as the legislative power may direct. If 
the line as fixed in accordance with its directions is in-
accurately located by the person whom it has directed to 
make the surv:ey and place the marks, the correction of the 
error lies with the Legislature, and not with the courts, 
unles~s it has provided that the courts shall determine the 
true location, which it has not done. The finding of the Court 
is that the common boundary line between Mendocino and 
Trinity counties was, and ever since the Fauntleroy survey, 
has been, adequately marked by monuments, lines and sur-
veys lawfully made. Such being the fact, there was no 
necessity or authority for a resurvey by the surveyor gen-
eral, under Section 3969 of the Political Code, unless it 
appeared that the monuments of the Fauntleroy survey had 
been displaced or destroyed, so that this line was no longer 
adequately marked. In that event the surveyor general 
could be called upon to resurvey and mark the line under 
the provisions of the Political Code above cited; but if he 
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should be called upon to make ~surch survey, it would be the 
Fauntleroy line which he must survey and mark, and not 
the actual position of the fortieth parallel of north latitude. 
"It is entirely immaterial whether there was, or was 
not, a dispute concerning the location of the line when the 
act of March 30, 1872, was pas,sed and the survey made 
thereunder." 
T1he arguments presented in the well reasoned land 
mark case above set forth al"!e applicable in thi,s case. 
The Legi,s.Jature on March 13, 1890, declared that the 
common boundary between Grand and San Juan Counties 
was paralle·l 38°30' North Latitude and provided a means 
Wlhich disputed boundaries could he settled. The exact posii-
tion of 38°30' North Latitude is still unmarked on the 
earth',s, surface. The Legislature provided a means to settle 
any disputed or uncertain boundary, and Grand and San 
Juan Counties, having taken advantage of this law, fixed 
and established the boundary wihic:h, according to the p}}O-
visions of the statute under which they acted, "shall be 
deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enact-
ment." 
It is not questioned by the Defendant that with the 
technological advancements that have been made since the 
turn of the century that Parallel 38°30' North Latitude can 
be more accurately marked on the earth's surface today 
than it could have been marked then; nor is it questioned 
that as man's knowledge of the earth's surface increase's 
and technology advances further that at some later 
date engineers and scientists will be able to more 
accurately mark Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
earth's surface than they can today. But are these two coun-
ties to be subjected to renew-ed and continued litigation each 
time new discoveries, more accurate instruments, or more 
technical surv-eys can be made? To answer this interroga-
tory in the affirmative would he to deny the Legislature 
of its right to fix county boundaries and to reduce the joint 
survey made, establish-ed and acqudesced in since 1912 to 
a mere ceremony. 
In the case of BARTON v. SANPETE COUNTY, 162 
P. 611 (Utah), Dec. 29, 1916, the Court, at page 612, states: 
"In 1907 in order to d-evise some method or means by which 
disputed boundary lines, including the one in question here, 
could defiruitely be fixed and •s-ettled, the Legislature en-
acted a statute (Comp. Laws 1907 Sec. 487), which reads 
as follows: "(The statute in qu-estion is set out in full and 
i•s' substantially the one cited to the Court in this case.) The 
Utah Court said: 
"1. The law, we think, is well settled that the Legis-
lature has the sole rpower to define and determdne the boun-
dary lines between counties and to provide the means or 
methods by which such boundaries, when in dispute, may 
he established and marked upon the ground. The law is 
tersely stated in 11 Cyc. 346, in the following words: 
"'It rests with the Legislature of the state, not only 
to defin-e the boundaries of counties, but also to provide the 
means whereby the true localities of such boundaries on 
the ground may be finally determined; and the settling of 
th-e boundary lines of a county by an unauthorized survey 
may be ratified by a curative act of the Legislature." 
In the case of JONES v. POWERS, 65 Tex. page 207, 
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TON v. SANPETE COUNTY, the Court said: 
"It rests with the Legislature to define the boun~ 
daries of counties and to provide the means whereby their 
true localities on the ground may be determined, and when 
these methods have been pursued and the line or lines so 
es·tablished should be considered the true ones, whether 
mathematically so or not. It is of more importance that the 
lines be certain and well defined than that they be abso-
lutely correct. If a di£ferent rule were adopted untold in-
jury and confusion might result. 
"The boundary lines of counties are matters of public 
concern; and when the'Y have been run and their position 
ascertained, by public authority, the actual line, though it 
should vary from the descriptive boundary designated in 
the s·tatute, must he conclusively binding upon all private 
individuals and county officers, until a different position 
is given to it by the publlic authorities. It is also familiar 
principal in relation to boundary lines, and one which seems 
applicable· to public as well as private boundaries, that 
description course shall yield to a line actually run." 
It is submitted here that the Courts of this State in 
the proper exercise of the juris diction granted to them by 
the Cons-titution of the State and the common law should, 
under the circumstances and ~evidence in this case, declare 
the line surveyed, marked, and acquiesced in, to be the true 
common boundary between the two counties. 
POINT II 
San Juan County is ·bound by the acts of its county 
commissioners in surveying, establishing, monumenting, 
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and thereafter recognizing a line as the common boundary 
line between the two counties· and is estopped by the doc-
trine of long possession, prescription, latches and acquies-
cence f~om now asserting a different boundary line and the 
trial oourt erred in not making a finding on thi,s question. 
At the pretrial hearing of this case, the trial court 
properly framed as one of the issues to be determined in 
this case "whether or not the parties have acquiesced in 
th boundary now established upon the surface of the 
surface of the earth." 
The trial court completely neglected to make any 
finding with respect to whether or not the parties had 
acquies·ced in a line marked on the earth's surface. 
It is submitted that there was such acquiescence and 
that the evidence on this point is clear, uncontradicted, and 
overwhelming that both parties have acquiesced in the line 
so surveyed and the south line of Township 26 South as 
the common boundary line between the two counties over a 
long period of time. 
Mr. Christensen, who participated in the joint survey 
of the two counties, stated that after completing the survey 
San Juan County used the line so surveyed in assessing the 
property in San Juan County. 
(The following is copied from the Transcript of Trial 
Proeeeding·s, Volume II, beginning with line 8, page 483, 
and ending on line 13, pa.ge 485.) 
Q. Mr. Christensen, as the As~sessor of San Juan 
County, did you abide by the line that was run on that 
survey? 
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MR. BURTON: We objected to it. No testimony 
that ihe was the ass·essor. 
MR. RUGGERI: Mr. Snow said "Oh, yes." Mr. Bur-
ton said, "Up to this time" and then I got into the act and 
said "Yes, there was. He said he was the assessor." Mr. Bur-
ton ·said, "He said he had been at various time·s." The wit-
ne·ss said, "At that time." Mr. Burton said, "I submit on 
the record. There is no qualification. I make my objection 
:Dor that reason." Mr. Rug~ri: "Were you the assessor 
at that time?" 
A. Yes·,. sir. 
Q. All right. Now as the ass:e-ssor did you abide by 
the line that you had run in assessing the taxes· in Sam 
Juan County? 
MR. BURTON: I objected to that a calling for a 
conclusion of the witness. 
THE COURT: Well, he may answer. 
Q. I will ask you again, Mr. Chriostensen. As the 
assessor of San Juan County, did you abide by this line that 
you had run :between the two counties in assessing the 
property of San Juan County? 
* * * * 
(Argument to Court.) 
MR. RUGGERI: And then this question was asked: 
"Did you assess· up to this line that you esta;blished ?" 
MR. BURTON: I objected to that as leading and 
suggestive. 
THE COURT: He may answer that question. 
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A. Well, it was g.enerally, pretty generally under-
s,tood. We knew the boys along the line there and about the 
only difficulty I ever had was a bunch of ste-ers left here 
one spring and they wrote they, that they hadn't been 
assessed. And I followed that bunch of steeT!s to Bed Rock, 
Colorado, to get the taxes on them. 
Q. Well, now, the real property, did you have any 
trouble in asses,sing the real property after that? 
MR. BUR TIN: Then, objected to that as calling for 
a conclusion of the witness. 
THE COURT: He may answer. 
A. Well, I couldn't answer it. I never had any 
difficulty. 
Q. Now you s·aid-is that the line that you used? 
MR. BURTON: I objected to that. It's incompetent, 
irrele'Vant and immaterial. 
MR. RUGGE'RI: The witness requested the ques-
tion, and this question was asked: 
"Now, the line, this boundary line that you made 
and put up, is that the line you used in assessing 
·p:voperty ?" 
A Yes, sir. 
Misrs Marian Bayles, the present Treasurer of San 
Juan County, on cross-examination testified that San Juan 
Ciunty was not and to her knowledge had not collected real 
property taxes in any of the disputed area when the follow-
ing question was put to her: 
' 
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Q. So that San Juan, as far as you know, at least, 
hasn't collelcted any real property taxes for property 
located in this oo-called disputed area, is that right, as 
far as you know? 
A. Not ·to my knowledge. (Transcript lines 28, 
29, 30, page 301, and lines 1 and 2, page 302.) 
It is significant that San Juan did not bring this 
action until December, 1958, some forty-six ( 46) years 
after the joint survey was· made, and then the action was 
bvought for the purpose of restraining the Defendant 
Grand County, its officers and agents from exercising 
jurisdiction over the so-called "di·sputed area" and for an 
accounting to re·cover taxes admittedly collected by Grand 
County in its exercise of jurisdiction over said so-called 
disputed area. 
The Plaintiff introduced evidence that San Juan 
County paid Grand County for maintaining roads located 
in the so-called disputed area for the years beginning with 
1955, (see testimony of Ada Palmer, San Juan Clerk, be-
ginning page 305), and collected taxes fl'lom the Utah 
Power and Light Company and the Pacicfic Northwest Pipe-
line Company for the years 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959 in an 
apparent attempt to show lack of acquies•cence. These feeble 
and be1lated attempts on the part of San Juan County to 
contradict the facts aflfirmatively pleaded by it, and ad-
mitted by the defendant, do not change the fact that for a 
long, long period of years both the plaint1ff and defendant 
treated the south line of Township 26 South, and the joint 
survey conducted by the parties in 1912 as the common 
boundary line between them and that said line was 
a~Cquiesced as the common boundary and •should _ now be · 
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declared by the Court to be the common boundary as a 
matter of law. 
As late as September 12, 1953, the County of San 
Juan, by and through its County Commissioners, deeded 
certain land in San Juan County [or the Grand County Air-
port, recognizing the south line oif Township 26 South to 
be the common boundary line betwee·n the two counties 
and that in the years 1956 and 1958, Grand County was 
asserting affirmative jurisdiction and control over all of 
said so-called disputed area. (See .A!bstract of Title to the 
Grand County Airport, marked Defendant's Exhibit 32.) 
McQuillen in Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, 
Volume 2, Section 7.09 states the rule of law applicable as 
follows: 
"Long acqui·escence in the location of municipal 
boundaries by the local corporation and the inhabitants 
thereof where all municipal ,action and improvements 
have been done under the assumption that such are the 
boundaries, notwithstanding they were not originally 
so located and hence, indefinite and uncertain." * * * * 
When the boundaries of a municipal corporation become 
ancient and are unmarked by artificial monuments, they 
may be proved by general reputation, in the absence of 
higher evidence." 
C. J. S. 20, (Counties) Sec. 22, page 773. "Long usage, 
acquiescence in, and recognition of a particular boundary 
as the true county boundary line may .have the effect of 
establishing it as such" 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of SUMMIT 
COUNTY v. RICH COUNTY 224 P. 653, cited earlier, seems 
to recognize the doctrine of acquiescence when it states on 
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page 655: "It is made to appear that the o£fieial·s of both 
Rich County and Summit County for many years acquies-
ced in the fact that the dispute area was a part of Summit 
County." 
WASHINGTON ROCK CO. v. YOUNG, 29 Utah 108. 
"The law is well setUed that an original survey of 
lands, upon the faith of which property rights have been 
based and acquired, controls over surveys subsequently 
made which injuriously affects •such rights." 
IN RHODE ISLAND v. MASSACHUSETTS, 4 How 
591, decided in 1846, it was alleged by Rhode Island that 
there was a mistake in the location of the boundary line 
between said states ; the Bill was dismissed; the Court said: 
"More than two centuries have passed since Massachusetts 
clajmed and took possession of the territory up to the line 
established by Woodward and Saffrey. This possession has 
ever since been steadily maintained, under an ass·ertion of 
right. It would be difficult to disturb a claim thus sanc-
tioned by time, however unfounded it might have been in 
its origin. * * * * Surely this, connected with the lap,se of 
time, must remove all doubt as to the right of the respond-
ent under the agreement of 1711 and 1718. No human 
transactions are unaffected by time. Its influence is seen 
on all things subject to change. And this is peculiarly the 
case in regard to matters which rest in memory, and which 
consequently fade with the lapse of time, and £ail with the 
lives of individuals. For the security of rights, whether of 
states or individuals, long possession under a claim of title 
is protected. And there is no controversy in which this 
great principle may be involved with greater justice and 
property than in a case of di·sputed boundary." 
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In INDIANA v. KENTUCKY, 136 U. S. 479, the terri-
tory in dispute was an island in the Ohio River, over which 
Kentucky had long exercised dominion and sovereignty. In 
its opinion this Court said: 
"Thi·s long acquiesence in the exercise by Kentucky 
of dominion and jurisdiction over the island is more poten-
tial tha,n the recollections of all the witnesses produced on 
either side. Such acquiesence in the a·ssertion of authority 
by the State of Kentucky, such omission to take any steps 
to assert her pres,ent claim by the State of Indiana, can 
only he regarded as a recognition of the right of Kentucky 
too plaint to be overcome, except by the clearest and most 
unquesUoned pr.oof. It is a principle of public law unive~ 
sally recognized, that long acquiesence in the possession of 
territory and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty 
over it, is oonclusive of the nation's tit1e and rightful 
authority." 
VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, 148 U. S. 503, the Su-
preme Court in a case where the contention that the com-
mon boundary line does not follow the parallel of 36 o and 
30' north but varies from it by running too far north, the 
Court said: 
"A boundary line between states or provinces as be-
tween private pe·rsons, which has been run out, located and 
marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and 
acquiesced in by the parties, for a long course of years, is 
conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat 
from the cours;es given in the original grant, and the line so 
established takes ·effect, not as an alienation of territory 
but as a true and ancient boundary. Lord Hardwichs in 
Penn. v. Lord Bltimore, 1 Vesey Sen. 444, 448; Boyd v. 
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Graves, 4 Wheat 513, Rhode Island v. Mass. 12 Pet. 65, 734; 
United States v. Stone, 2 Wall, 525, 537; Kellogg v. Smith, 
7 Cush., 375, 382; Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush., 327; Hunt 
on Boundarie·s 3rd Edition 306.'' 
HUNT COUNTY v. RAINS COUNTY, 116 Tex. 277, 
7 S. W. page 655. 
"In sound policy a county line thai has bee-n located 
and acquiesced in for many years, as here, should not be 
changed unless e-xpressly required by law to be done, even 
though such line was not the correct one in the first in-
stance for interminable confusion would result from the 
change of conditions orf such long standing. Road and •school 
bond issues would be affected, as well as individual privil-
eges and status in respect to this line." 
It was said in the case of CITY OF RACINE v. EM-
MERSON, 85 Wis., 80-86: "The public and private owners 
have acquiesced in the- lines es£abHshed by the first and 
original survey and plat, and by practical location and un-
disturbed possession for a great many years, and there does 
not seem to have been any necessity to disturb them at this 
late day. The judgment of the Circuit Court i~s reversed, 
and the cause remanded with dir.e-ction to enter judgment 
in favor of the defendant." 
MARYLAND v. WEST VIRGINIA, 217 U. S. 1, is 
directly in point. It was contended by Maryland and appar-
ently not disputed by West Virginia, that the survey of the 
new meridian contended for by Maryland was much more 
accurate than the old established and recognized line. West 
Virginia contended that the long recognized line was the 
boundary notwithstanding its jog, irregularities, imperfe·c-
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tions and dtff>erent location and regardless of the fact that 
it was not intended as a fixation of an inter-state bound-
ary line Wihen it was surveyed. The Court sustained the 
claims of West Virginia and caused the long recognized 
boundary to be resurveyed and remonumented by oom-
mis,sioners. 
"In this case we think a right, in its nature prescrip-
tive, has arisen, practically undisturbed for many years, 
not to be overthrown without doing violence to principles 
of established rigllt and justice· equally binding upon states 
and individuals. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657. 
"Upon the whole case, the conclusions at which we 
1have arrived, we believe, best meet the facts disclosed in 
this record, are warranted by the applicable principles of 
law and equity, and will least disturb rights and title long 
regarded as se-ttl>ed and fixed by the people most to be 
be affected." 
Both counties having treated the line estahlished by 
the joint survey of the two counties as their common boun-
dary, the Court should have entered -a finding of fact in 
thi~s regard and concluded, as a matter of law, that the line 
so long acquiesced in, is the common boundary between the 
two counties. 
POINT III. 
The Court should have determined as a matter of law 
that 38°30' North Latitude, as historically marked and 
monumented, is the common boundary line between the 
two counties and was what the Legislature creating the 
counties intended as the true common boundary between 
the counties. 
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Artide· XI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah, 
insofar as applicable, reads as follows : 
"Section 1. (Existing counties, precincts and school 
districts recognized) . 
"The ·several counties of the Territory of Utah, exist-
ing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution are 
hereby recognized as l.egal subdivisions of this State, and 
,the precincts, a.nd school di·stricts, now existing in said 
counties, as legal subdivisions thereof, and they shall so con-
tinue until changed by law in pu~suance of this Article. 
"Section 2. (Removal of County seats.) 
"Section 3. (Changing County Lines.) 
"No territory shall be stricken from any county un-
less a majority of the voters living in such territory, a1s weU 
as the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote there-
for, and then only under suC!h conditions as may be pre-
scribed by general law." 
In the second Utah case of SUMMIT COUNTY v. 
RICH COUNTY, '224 P. 653, the Utah Court in interpreting 
the provisions of the state constitution quoted above, statoes 
as follows: "The following legal propositions, in the opin-
ion of the writer, are fairly deducible from the opinions o:f 
the court in thoese cases: (a) that the Legislature by reason 
of the provisions of Section 3, Art. 11, of the Constitution 
quoted, is without authority by legislative act or other-
wise to e-stablish or locate new or any boundary line between 
counties where a boundary line exists, unless the descrip-
tion of the boundary line is so indefinite, uncertain or 
ambiguous that the line cannot be definitely determined 
from the description of it given, or for any other reason 
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the line cannot be located on the ground. (b) that the Leg-
islature must, in atte·mpting to establish the correct boun-
dary line, so far as possible, establish and determine the 
boundary line so as to carry into effect and make certain 
the boundary line· as it was intended to be established and 
fixed prior to the enactment of the correcting legislative 
act. (c) that any act of the Legislature that attempts to 
establish a diffe-rent or new boundary line wihout regard 
to the line so originally intended to be established is void 
as being within the inhibition of the Constitution." 
"* * * * In so establishing the line, the Legislature 
!clearly faled to carry into effect the intent of the Terri-
torial Legislature in its effort to establish the boundary 
line between Summit County and Rich County. If the legal 
conclusions hereinbefore stated are rightly deducible from 
the opinions of this Court on the former appeal of this case 
and in the Barton case, supra, respecting the power and 
duty of the Legislature with reference to the establishment 
of boundary lines between counties, then it must necessarily 
follow that the act of the Legislature of 1917, in determin-
ing and fixing the boundary line as the same affects the 
area in dispute and he·rein questioned is in contravention of 
the provi,sions of our State Constitution and is therefore 
null and void. 
" ( 4) We are not unmindful of the rule of law and 
courts will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitu-
<t~onal if by any consistent reasoning it can be held to be 
otherwise. If, however, appearing from this record that 
the Le·gislature, in establishing the boundary line between 
Summit County and Rich County by the act of 1917, dis-
regarded the plain intent of the Territorial Legislature in 
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fixing the boundary line between such counti.e·s, thereby 
detaching from Summit County the dis.puted area which 
clearly was within that county under the description of the 
formerly e·staJblished boundary, we can see no escape from 
the conclusion that the lower court was right in declaring 
and holding the Act of the 1917 Legislature unconstitu-
tional and therefore void." 
The old plats on file with the· State Land Office and 
the Bureau Oif Land Management •show that there were sur-
veys conducted and that the surveyors of the day placed 
Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude and the south line of Town-
ship 26 South as the· same line. See Defendant'·s Exhibit 23 
which plat was referred to by State Engineer Bacon in 
1925, wihen he stnted in a letter addressed to the County 
Attorney of San Juan County, as follows: 
"On looking into the· •situation in the Surveyor 
General's Of.fice I find that the south township line of 
Township 26 South is meant to coincide with a line at 
latitude of 38 ° degrees 30 minutes No. Owing to field 
errors there may be a slight variation but I do not con-
sider it at all material when weighed against the fact 
of having this line definitely and plainly marked on the 
ground as would be the case of a township line. There 
is also the big advantage of having all legal descriptions 
of land reach right to the county line as would be the 
c3ise when this line coincided with a legal subdivision 
line. I find that the SE corner of Township 26 South, 
Range 22 East, and also the SE corner of Township 26 
South, Range ·23 East are given as located exactly at 
latitude No. 38°30'." 
Mr. Lambe·rt testified as follows : 
"Q. From your observations from those particular 
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maps and plats, do you think that the-do you concur with 
the opinion of Mr. Bacon in that letter that it indicates 
that the south line of Township 26 South is the common 
boundary line between the two counties? (Lines 25 through 
29, page 160.) 
A. As far as Mr. Ba.con is concerned, I think he can 
ihave his opinion. From what I have seen of the Township 
plat and the designation on the Township plats and some 
of the old ones in the early daJlS, the latitude of 38°30' is 
designated on those plats as fairly close to the south boun-
da.ry of Township 26. (Lines 19 through 24, page 161.) 
Q. And some of them it's actually coincidental? 
A. That's right. It actually crosses at some places 
and no Township line could be concurrent to a parallel." 
(Lines 25 through 27, page 161.) 
The evidence sihows that all of the old maps place the 
common boundary of Emery County, from which Grand 
County was originally f.ormed, and San Juan County, and 
later Grand and San Juan Counties, to be on the south line 
of Township 26 South, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See 
Defendant's Exhibits 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.) 
Mr. Hubert Lambert, testifying on cross-examination, 
stated as follows: 
"Q. Plaintiff's EXJhibit 25 and ask you if you can 
identify that document. 
A. Well, it's a General Land Office map of the 
Territory of Utah, published in 1884. (Lines 19 through 22, 
page 166, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Volume I.) 
THE COURT: What was the question, 
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MR. RUGGERI: I simply asked, Your Honor, from 
observing this map and the legend identifying county boun-
daries thereon whether or not that map, dated 1884, shows 
tlhe officialness of it on its face·, shows that the common 
boundary line between Grand and San Juan Counties is 
coincidental with and the same line- as the south line of 26 
South. 
THE COURT: He may answer that. 
A. The- map indicates that the south boundary of 
Township 26 South is the same as the boundary between 
Emery County and San Juan, not Grand. (Lines 22 through 
30, page 168, and lines 1 and 2, page 169.) 
Q. I show you what has been marked for identifica-
tion as Derfendant's Exhibit No. 31 and ask you if you can 
identify that? 
A. This is a map o[ the Territory of Utah issued-
1889 by the Department of the Interior, the General Land 
Office. 
Q. And does it have a 1e·~nd for the county boun-
daries on it? (Lines 17 through 25, page 160.) 
A. There is no designation in the legend, for county 
lines. However, the county lines are marked by heavy black 
lines ajs indicated ·oy the names of the counties and the 
boundaries thereof. 
Q. Is the heavy black line in the same place as the 
south line of Township 26 South as shown on thi~s map? 
A. In the instance of two~f two townships the line 
is coincidental between Emery and San Juan. The rest o[ 
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the county line doe1s not show designation in this particular 
map. Just in this particular map. Just two townships on 
the east side. (Lines 13 through 26, page 170.) 
Q. (By Mr. Ruggeri) I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 27 and ask you if you can identify that? 
A. This is a map of the State of Utah issued in 1902 
by the- General Land Office under the direction of Harry 
Keen the Chief of the Drafting Division. 
Q. Does thi~s particular map have a legend for boun-
daries for counties on it? 
A. This map has a legend for boundaries of counties 
in he·avy dark lines. 
~Q. Does that boundary coincide with, or is it, ac-
cording to this map, coincidental as shown on this map 
with the south line of Township 26 South? (Lines 15 
through 27, page 174.) 
A. Well, as near as can be determined from the map, 
the line- is between figures 26 and 27 with no other line and 
designa~ted as the boundary of 26 and 27, and, therefore, I 
think you would have to assume from the map that the 
heavy line is the county line on the south line of 26. * * * * 
(ines 8 through 17, page 175.) 
Similar examination went on with respect to Defend-
ant'~s Exhibits 28, 29, and 30. (See transcript pages 175 
throuwh 182.) 
The Legislature creating Grand County in 1890, using 
the maps and plats available to it at that time, intended 
the common boundary line between the two countie·s to be 
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established at the location :shown on said maps and plats 
and could not have intended that the common boundary 
line between Grand and San Juan Counties to be fixed by 
a Coast and Geodetic Reconnaissance conducted in 1958 
with the aid of pre-cision instruments and an elaborate net-
work of triangulation stations, neither of which were avail-
able in 1890. 
In applying the rule laid down in the SUMMIT 
COUNTY v. RICH COUNTY case it is evident that the Leg-
islato~s creating Grand County were looking at maps that 
showed that the common boundary line between the two 
counties were coincidental with and the same line as Town-
ship 26 South, Salt L.a,ke Base and Meridian, and that the 
court should have declared said line rus the common boun-
dary line between the two counties as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence shows: 
1. 'IThat the county surveyors of the two counties 
surveyed a line and marked and monumented it in the year 
1912 in an attemJ}t to give a pra~tical interpretation and 
meaning to Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude. 
2. That the joint survey conducted by the counties 
in 1912 is substantially the same as the south line of Town-
ship 26 South, Salt Lake Ba:se and Meridian. 
3. That all of the old maps which antedate the crea-
tion of Grand County show the south line of Township 26 
South to be the common boundary line between the two 
counties. 
4. That many of the old plats show the south line of 
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Township 26 South to be coincident with and the same line 
as Parallel38°30' North Latitude. 
5. That the State Engineer on September 5, 1925, 
advised the San Juan County officials that the "South 
Township line of Township 26 South is meant to coincide 
with a line at latitude 38°30' No." 
6. That Mr. Lambert, the present Utah Deputy State 
Engineer, ooncurs in 1959, with the conclusion of Mr. Bacon. 
7. That the two counties acquiesced in said line so 
marked and monumented until very recent times. 
8. That no legislative or judicial determination of 
the common boundary line between the two counties was 
sougiht by San Juan County until it filed this action on 
December 18, 1958. 
9. That when San Juan County brought this action 
it did not bring its action to relocate and remark the boun-
dary line previously marked, monumented and acquiesced 
in, but it brought the action to move the common boundary 
an indefinite and undetermined distance approximately 2/3 
of a mile north of 'the south line of Township 26 South, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
10. That the only reference to any fixed or definitely 
ascertainable place on the earth's surface mentioned in 
Plaintiff's Complaint is the south line of Township 26 
South, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
11he Defendant is entitled to a judicial determination 
that its common boundary with the Plaintiff County has 
been established hy the counties pursuant to law, and 
acquiesced in over a long period of time, and is as historl· 
cally designated. 
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